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I.  INTRODUCTION 
If you walked into the woods and discovered a new type of mineral, 
picked it up, and brought it back to society, would you be entitled to a 
patent for that mineral?  What if that mineral weighed two tons or was 
buried deep underground, and it required substantial financial resources 
and hard work to retrieve it?  The answer to both of these questions is 
unequivocally no.1  Now what if you went out into the woods, discovered 
a new type of bacterium in the soil, retrieved it from the soil, and brought 
it back to society, would you be entitled to a patent then?  The answer is, 
surprisingly, yes.2  What characteristic does an isolated naturally 
occurring organism have that a naturally occurring mineral lacks that 
makes the isolated organism eligible for a patent? 
This Comment will argue there is no distinction between these two 
discoveries: neither should merit a patent.  Rather, due to the conflation 
of two distinct patent law requirements, patent eligible subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 1013 and novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a),4 the 
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 1.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) 
(stating “groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 
inquiry.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (stating “a new mineral discovered in 
the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.”). 
 2.  John Edward Schneider, Microorganisms and the Patent Office: To Deposit or Not to 
Deposit, That is the Question, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 592, 593 n.12 (1984) (identifying three separate 
patents on microorganisms isolated from nature). 
 3.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  Section 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 
 4.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  Section 102(a) states: “A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless—(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, 
on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; 
or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application 
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requirement that an invention be “made by man” has been rendered 
unclear, and is made all the more difficult by the advanced and complex 
nature of biotechnology.  By applying a doctrine intended to go only to 
the novelty of an invention over the prior art, patents are being granted 
on “inventions” not made by man: isolated microorganisms.  These 
microorganisms are merely plucked from their surroundings; they are not 
in any way altered by human hands.  However, according to the current 
Patent Office practice, this mere act of isolation entitles the person who 
first isolates the microorganism to a patent claiming the microorganism 
itself. 
This Comment will argue that the practice of granting patents on 
isolated organisms is improperly extending the scope of proscribed 
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because isolated organisms 
fall within the “product of nature” exception to patent eligible subject 
matter.  Part II will provide the precedent for the isolation and 
purification doctrines of law, as they pertain to both the requirement of 
novelty and patent eligible subject matter.  The law as it pertains to 
novelty is often conflated with the law in regards to patent eligible 
subject matter, understanding the basis of both is paramount.  Part II will 
also argue that the isolation/purification doctrine regarding novelty is a 
legal fiction, and can be better addressed by the other already existing 
patent law requirements.  With this precedent in mind, Part II will then 
synthesize an isolation/purification framework that can be used to 
determine if an isolated or purified substance is patent eligible subject 
matter.  Part II will conclude by discussing the Patent Office’s policy on 
isolated organisms and the foundation for the policy.  Part III will begin 
by explaining why the Patent Office’s foundation for granting isolated 
organism patents, In re Bergy,5 is weak, as it conflates the law as it 
pertains to novelty with that of patentable subject matter.  Then, Part III 
will evaluate a patent and a patent application claiming isolated 
microorganisms to demonstrate the isolation/purification framework and 
to show why the subject matter of these patents should be outside the 
scope of § 101. Part IV will then provide concluding remarks regarding 
the framework. 
                                                          
for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as 
the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of 
the claimed invention.” 
 5.  563 F.2d 1031, (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated, Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Patent Law 
Patent law exists as a mechanism to benefit society by protecting the 
works of inventors, thus incentivizing inventors to invest their time, 
effort, and money developing technologies that benefit all of society.6  
The founders sought to draft the patent laws using broad language, 
following the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson that “ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement.”7  Thus, the United States Constitution 
was drafted to grant Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”8  Indeed, by the time the Patent Act of 1952 was enacted, it 
was intended that inventors should be able to get a patent on “anything 
under the sun that is made by man.”9 
However, in exercising this power, Congress did choose to limit the 
type of subject matter eligible for patentability.  35 U.S.C. § 101, titled 
Inventions Patentable, states “whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”10  This provision 
provides for four categories of patentable subject matter: processes, 
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.11  The expansive 
nature of these categories is in line with Congress’ intent for the patent 
laws to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”12 
Despite this broad reading of patentable subject matter, not 
everything falls within the scope of § 101: laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas are three such exclusions from patentable 
subject matter.13  While the Court views these as subject matter 
exclusions, laws of nature and physical phenomena can really be viewed 
                                                          
 6.  ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 2 (4th ed. 2013). 
 7.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson 75–76 (Washington ed. 1871)). 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 9.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-
1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 10.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 2399 (1952). 
 13.  See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
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as absolute bars to novelty: a patent on a law of nature or physical 
phenomena can never be new, as it first existed in nature. 
35 U.S.C. § 102 requires that an invention be “novel” in order to be 
entitled to a patent.14  Because the laws of nature and physical 
phenomena subject matter exclusions are really absolute novelty bars, 
certain aspects of the “novelty” jurisprudence have been conflated with 
the eligible subject matter jurisprudence of § 101.15  One such aspect is 
the law of novelty as it pertains to isolated and purified forms of the prior 
art.16  Thus, to understand why the current practice of granting patents on 
isolated organisms is outside the scope of § 101, a proper understanding 
of the underpinnings of the “isolation/purification” doctrine as it pertains 
to novelty and patent eligible subject matter is necessary. 
1. The Wood–Paper Patent Case 
Perhaps the earliest case to mention the isolation/purification 
question was The Wood–Paper Patent case.17  The Wood–Paper Patent 
case focused on, among other things, a reissue patent to Watt & Burgess, 
numbered 1448, and owned by the American Paper Company.18  The 
1448 patent was directed to a product: “a pulp suitable for the 
manufacture of paper, made from wood or other vegetable substances.”19 
The alleged infringer in the case, the Fibre Disintegrating Company, 
argued that the 1448 patent was invalid as lacking novelty.20  The use of 
pulp in making paper had been known prior to 1853, the year the 1448 
patent was filed, and in fact many patents had been issued relating to the 
pulp and the process of making it.21  However, prior to Watt & Burgess, 
no pulp-making process produced pulp in a condition of purity in a first 
instance, but instead could be later purified after the initial step.22  While 
these old methods did not produce pure pulp, the pulp nonetheless was 
suitable for the making of paper. 
American Paper Company argued, however, that because the pulp 
from their process was pure, and all prior attempts to produce pulp lead 
                                                          
 14.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 15.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 16.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 17.  Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co. (The Wood–Paper Patent), 90 U.S. 566 
(1874).  
 18.  Id. at 593. 
 19.  Id. at 594. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 597. 
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to pulp that was not pure, their pulp was a “new” product, thus meriting 
patent protection. 23 
The Court disagreed. The Court noted that “it is quite obvious that a 
manufacture, or a product of a process, may be no novelty, while, at the 
same time, the process or agency by which it is produced may be both 
new and useful.”24  Similarly, the Court noted that merely extracting a 
known product in a new way does not make the known product itself 
new.25  The Court then doubted whether “a slight difference in the degree 
of purity of an article . . . justifies denominating the products different 
manufactures,” but declined to decide that issue, as the product claimed 
was to “pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper,” rather than to a 
purified pulp product.26 
While the Court did not answer the question of whether a 
purification of a known product could be deemed “novel,” and while The 
Wood–Paper Patent case did not pertain directly to § 101 issues of 
patentable subject matter, the discussion is nonetheless insightful when § 
101 is viewed as an absolute bar to novelty. 
2. Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. 
One year prior to the Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.27 
decision, the Seventh Circuit heard a case involving aspirin.28  At the 
time of the case, no known medicine existed that had the therapeutic 
properties of the claimed aspirin.29  However, an inventor by the name of 
Kraut had previously claimed to invent what he thought was acetyl 
salicylic acid (aspirin).30  Hoffman, the inventor of the claimed aspirin at 
issue, stated however that because he had used a different procedure and 
obtained a chemical with entirely different properties from that of Kraut, 
he had in fact actually obtained acetyl salicylic acid, and Kraut was 
mistaken.31  Appellant, however, asserted the two compounds were the 
same because they had the same chemical formula and responded to the 
same tests.32  Thus, appellant contended that the claimed aspirin was 
                                                          
 23.  Id. at 594. 
 24.  Id. at 593. 
 25.  Id. at 594. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 28.  Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910). 
 29.  Id. at 702–03. 
 30.  Id. at 703. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
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merely the purified form of the Kraut compound, and therefore not 
entitled to patent protection.33 
The court started by noting that the mere fact that the chemical 
formula was the same for both compounds was of little impact to the 
analysis.34  This is because two compounds having the same formula 
could differ widely depending on the level and kind of impurities 
present.35  Having disposed of this contention, the court turned to the 
response of both compounds to the same tests.36  First, the Kraut 
compound did not react the same way as Hoffman’s when it was boiled 
in water.37  Appellant then maintained that he could, through a process 
involving boiling water, arrive at the Hoffman compound.38  This was 
not enough to suggest that the two compounds were the same, but in fact 
was just evidence that the Kraut compound could be treated and 
processed in such a way as to produce some portions of the Hoffman 
compound.39 
Moreover, even if the two compounds were chemically and 
analytically the same, Hoffman’s recrystallized product provided 
completely different therapeutic qualities from Kraut’s: Hoffman’s 
compound was the first to overcome the downsides of salicylic acid 
without sacrificing its benefits.40  This compound was an unquestionable 
benefit to mankind, “something new in a useful art, such as our patent 
policy was intended to promote.”41  It was irrelevant to the court that “the 
medicine thus produced is lifted out of a mass that contained, chemically, 
the compound; for, though the difference between [the compounds] be 
one of purification only . . . patentability would follow.  In the one case 
the mass is made to yield something to the useful arts; in the other case 
what is yielded is chiefly interesting as a fact in chemical learning.”42  
While this holding wanders into the separate area of “utility,” its 
language on purification is of greater significance. 
                                                          
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 703–04. 
 36.  Id. at 704. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 705. 
 42.  Id.  
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3. Union Carbide v. American Carbide Co. 
A second case also decided one year prior to Parke-Davis43 was 
Union Carbide v. American Carbide Co.44  The Second Circuit decided 
Union Carbide, making it directly binding on Judge Learned Hand.45  
The claimed invention at issue was crystalline calcium carbonate, a new 
form of calcium carbonate that had not previously existed.46  The alleged 
infringer contended that this was not patently novel over amorphous 
calcium carbonate, as it was merely a new form of the same 
composition.47 
But the court disagreed, noting that “patentable novelty . . . may be 
founded upon superior efficiency; upon superior durability, including the 
ability to retain a permanent form when exposed to the atmosphere; upon 
a lesser tendency to breakage and loss [and] upon purity.”48  This 
crystalline form of calcium carbide provided a far greater yield than the 
amorphous calcium carbide, thus providing a patentable difference over 
the prior art.49  Thus, it was within the patent laws to uphold the claimed 
calcium carbonate.50  But the court went one step further, noting that it 
was not just lawful, but also just, because “[t]o hold an important 
discovery which has given to the world a commercially new product . . . 
not entitled to protection for want of novelty, would, as it seems to us, be 
applying the patent statute to defeat its fundamental purposes.”51 
4. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co. 
Over a century ago, Judge Learned Hand laid the doctrinal 
foundation for the patenting of isolated organisms in Parke-Davis & Co. 
v. H.K. Mulford Co.52  The patent at issue in Parke-Davis concerned a 
pure and stable form of a naturally occurring chemical found in the 
suprarenal glands of certain animals.53  This purified version of the 
                                                          
 43.  Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified, 196 F. 496 
(2d Cir. 1912). 
 44.  181 F. 104 (2d Cir. 1910). 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 104. 
 47.  Id. at 106. 
 48.  Id. at 106–07.   
 49.  Id. at 107. 
 50.  Id. at 108. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).  
 53.  Parke-Davis, 196 F. at 497 (discussing the patent at issue in the lower court and decided by 
Learned Hand). 
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chemical maintained the same physiological characteristics of the natural 
chemical—“hemostatic, blood pressure raising, and astringent 
properties”—but managed to achieve these properties in a satisfactory 
way that the natural chemical could not.54  Judge Hand noted that the 
patentee was the first person to successfully isolate this substance in a 
pure form; however, he did not view the claimed chemical composition 
as merely a more pure version of the natural chemical, but as a distinct 
compound altogether.55  The claimed compound did not include a salt 
and the natural compound only existed in nature in a salt form.56  Thus, 
the claimed compound was a separate and distinct compound.57 
Far more controversial, however, was Judge Hand’s next assertion: it 
would have been irrelevant if the claimed composition were merely 
unchanged after being extracted from the animal.58  According to Judge 
Hand, “there is no rule that [extracted products without change] are not 
patentable.”59  However, Judge Hand was mistaken on this point.  As 
discussed above, the Supreme Court in The Wood–Paper Patent case 
expressly stated that a product that is known and merely extracted 
“cannot be called a new manufacture.”60  Judge Hand relied on the 
above-discussed Union Carbide as authority.61  However, Union Carbide 
did not suggest that extracted products are patent eligible, but rather 
upheld a patent that claimed an entirely new form of a chemical 
compound that did not exist in nature and was novel as to prior art 
carbide patents.62  By viewing the products of nature exception as an 
absolute bar to novelty, it becomes clear why the patent in Union 
Carbide warranted patent protection, while the patent in Parke-Davis 
should have been struck down.  The crystallized form of calcium 
carbonate had not existed in nature, and thus was not “anticipated” by 
nature. Thus the absolute bar to novelty does not apply.  By contrast, 
there is the hypothetical patent on the extracted product suggested by 
Judge Hand in Parke-Davis.  This extracted product did exist in nature 
prior to the patent, and therefore is anticipated by nature. 
                                                          
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co. (The Wood–Paper Patent), 90 U.S. 566, 
594 (1874). 
 61.  Parke-Davis, 196 F. at 103. 
 62.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
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5. General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co. 
The next court to address the issue of isolation and purification was 
the Third Circuit in 1928 in General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio 
Co.63  The patent at issue in General Electric was to “tungsten and 
method of making the same for use as filaments of incandescent electric 
lamps and for other purposes.”64  Initially, the patent was granted 
because it was believed that tungsten found in nature was highly brittle 
and incapable of being turned into wires.65  Thus, when the patentee 
managed to take the natural tungsten and through his process create a 
metal with new properties not found in natural tungsten, it was believed 
he had invented a new metal that was not pure tungsten, and therefore 
entitled to a patent.66  However, it was later determined that the “natural” 
tungsten was in actuality an oxide of tungsten, WO3, and the patentee 
had merely managed to separate the tungsten from the oxide form.67  The 
issue then was “whether the tungsten of which the patent speaks is the 
tungsten of nature with its inherent quality of ductility or is a new metal 
produced by [the patentee] which is wholly different from anything that 
nature provides.”68 
The court started by noting the principle that “[i]f [the metal] is a 
natural thing then clearly . . . he cannot have a patent for it because a 
patent cannot be awarded for a discovery or for a product of nature, or 
for a chemical element.”69  The court began by discussing how the 
patentee had obtained the pure tungsten.  The patentee “took tungsten as 
it ‘existed’ (WO3) or as it is found in the earth, its native abode, and by 
his process converted it into pure tungsten.”70  Thus, the patentee had 
merely discovered the natural properties of tungsten inherent to it, not 
created by any man.71  For that reason, the patentee was not entitled to 
the patent.72 
                                                          
 63.  28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928). 
 64.  Id. at 641. 
 65.  Id. at 642. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. (citing United States Indus. Chem. Co., Inc. v. Theroz Co., 25 F.2d 387, 391–92 (4th 
Cir. 1928)). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 643.   
 72.  Id. 
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6. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.  
The rule from General Electric was expanded in Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,73 where the Court was asked to determine 
whether a patent for a mixture of naturally occurring strains of bacteria 
was patent eligible.74  The bacterium at issue were naturally occurring 
root nodule bacteria that aid leguminous plants in the fixing of nitrogen 
from the air which is later converted in the plant for organic nitrogenous 
compounds.75  Prior to the patent at issue, it was well known that there 
were six such species of these root nodules, and that each species is 
distinct from one another with varying nitrogen-fixing efficiency.76  It 
was further known how to select the strains that were strongest to 
produce a culture that are then placed in a powder or liquid and sold to 
be used in the inoculation of seeds.77  However, up until the patent at 
issue, most inoculants were single species inoculants, and those mixtures 
that existed proved to be unsatisfactory.78  It was believed that the 
different species present in the early mixtures were mutually inhibitive 
upon one another, thus nullifying the benefit of creating the mixture.79 
The patent at issue was thus a mixture that managed to solve the 
problems present in the previous mixtures.80  The inventor of the 
mixture, Bond, had managed to discover new strains that did not cause 
the mutually inhibitive properties present in the earlier generation 
mixtures.81  His patent then, provided for a novel mixture of root nodule 
bacteria strains that were capable of inoculating multiple types of seeds, 
a feat prior mixtures could not accomplish.82  It was this mixture the 
Court was asked to consider. 
Despite the novel nature of the mixture at hand, the Court invalidated 
the claims to the mixture.83  The non-inhibitive quality of the mixture at 
issue was not created by Bond, but rather was a quality provided to the 
bacteria by nature.84  As such, the mixture could not be patentable as it 
                                                          
 73.  333 U.S. 127, 131–32 (1948). 
 74.  Id. at 128 n.1.  
 75.  Id. at 128. 
 76.  Id. at 129. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. at 130. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 131. 
 84.  Id. at 130. 
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falls within the “laws of nature” exception to § 101.85  In the Court’s 
view, the mere “aggregation of species” did not move the mixture into 
the scope of eligible subject matter.86  It is immaterial that the discovery 
made was ingenious and that the mixture did in fact have advantages to 
the mixtures that came before it,87 “but a product must be more than new 
and useful to be patented; it must also satisfy the requirements of 
invention or discovery.”88 
7. Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
Parke-Davis and Funk, while laying important foundation for patents 
on isolated organisms, could not alone usher in a wave of new patents on 
isolated organisms.  One key question still needed to be answered: is life 
patentable?  The answer came in 1980, when the Supreme Court decided 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.89  As a scientist at General Electric, Dr. 
Chakrabarty had developed a bacterium, pseudomonas bacterium, which 
could break down crude oil and other environmental pollutants.90  It was 
this bacterium that was the subject of the patent at issue in Chakrabarty. 
Dr. Chakrabarty filed his patent application in 1972 and, in it, 
asserted 36 claims related to the bacterium.91  This bacterium was the 
product of human invention and the oil degrading property of the 
bacterium was not found in any natural bacterium.92  The patent 
application included three types of claims: process claims related to 
creating the bacteria, claims to an inoculum (comprising the bacteria and 
a carrier material), and the bacteria itself.93  The patent examiner allowed 
the first two categories of claims during the application process, but 
rejected the claims to the bacteria itself.94  The examiner gave two 
reasons for this rejection: microorganisms are products of nature and, as 
a matter of law, living things are not patentable subject matter as defined 
                                                          
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 131.  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. 
 89.  447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 90.  Id. at 305; see also Ananda Chakrabarty, UIC, http://www.uic.edu/depts/mcmi/faculty/ 
chakrabarty/ (last visited May 8, 2015) (listing credentials). 
 91.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.  
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 305–06.  
 94.  Id. at 306. 
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by 35 U.S.C. § 101.95  Following this rejection, Chakrabarty appealed to 
the Patent Office Board of Appeals.96 
On appeal, the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection 
by the examiner on the grounds that living things are not patentable 
subject matter.97  The Board based its decision on the 1930 Plant Patent 
Act: according to the Board, the passage of this Act by Congress showed 
a clear intent to exclude living things from the scope of § 101.98  
However, relying on its decision in In re Bergy,99 the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed the Board’s decision.100  In Bergy, 
the CCPA held that the mere fact that a microorganism is alive is without 
legal significance in patent law.101  However, following this decision, the 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Bergy, and remanded the case 
back to the CCPA.102  Following reexamination by the CCPA, they 
reaffirmed their earlier decisions that whether a microorganism was alive 
was immaterial.103  This decision was appealed by the Commissioner of 
Patents and Trademarks, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
address the issues present in Chakrabarty.104 
The Court framed the issue as “whether respondent’s micro-
organism constitutes a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within 
the meaning of [35 U.S.C. § 101].”105  To answer this question, the Court 
first had to define the terms.  “Manufacture” had been defined by the 
Court to align with its dictionary meaning, that is, as “‘the production of 
articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these 
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by 
hand-labor or by machinery.’”106  The Court had likewise construed 
“composition of matter” in line with its common usage as “all 
compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, 
whether they be the result of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, 
or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or solids.”107 
                                                          
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated, Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). 
 100.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306.  
 101.  Id. (citing In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977)). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 307.  
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 308 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)). 
 107.  Id. (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (internal 
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These expansive terms, along with the legislative history of the 
Patent Act of 1793,108 show Congress’ intent to “‘include anything under 
the sun that is made by man’” within the confines of § 101.109  Despite 
this seemingly boundless view of patent law, not all discoveries are 
patentable under § 101: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas” have never been held to be patentable subject matter.110  
These principles led the Court to conclude that Chakrabarty’s bacterium 
was patentable subject matter,111 and in doing so placed living objects 
categorically within the scope of § 101.112 
8. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
The isolation/purification standard set by the Court in Parke-Davis 
and Funk would be called into question in the landmark decision 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.113  The 
patents at issue in Myriad concerned claims to two genes, BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, mutations to which caused an increase risk of developing breast 
cancer.114  At issue for the Court were nine composition claims relating 
to the two genes at issue.115  These claims typically operate by claiming 
the DNA coding that instructs a human cell to produce one of a list of 
amino acids listed in the patent application.116  Also included in the 
claims was a subset to aforementioned claims: claims to any strand of 15 
or more nucleotides within the DNA already claimed.117  These claims 
collective gave Myriad the exclusive right to isolate any strand of 15 or 
more nucleotides of an individual’s BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genes.118  
However, the patents were not limited to the naturally occurring BRCA 1 
                                                          
citation omitted)). 
 108.  The Court noted that “[t]he Act embodied Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement.’”  Id. at 308–09 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–
76 (Washington ed. 1871)).  
 109.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).  
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See id. at 311 (rejecting petitioner’s argument that Congress did not intend to include living 
things within the scope of “composition of matter” and “manufacture”). 
 113.  133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  
 114.  Id. at 2112. 
 115.  Id. at 2113. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id.  
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and BRCA 2 genes, but also claimed the cDNA, or synthetically created, 
sequences of the BRCA genes.119 
The procedural history of this case is fairly complicated.  The lawsuit 
started when several parties brought a lawsuit against Myriad seeking a 
declaratory action by the Southern District of New York stating that 
Myriad’s claims were invalid.120  The court granted the petitioners 
motion for summary judgment, holding that the composition claims were 
invalid as products of nature and thus outside the scope of § 101.121  On 
appeal, however, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of summary 
judgment in respect to the claims of isolated DNA.122  But this reversal 
was short lived, as the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the 
judgment, and remanded the case to be reevaluated in light of the Court’s 
decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc.123 
On remand, the Federal Circuit maintained its position and held that 
the claims to isolated DNA and cDNA were patent eligible.124  However, 
the Federal Circuit was in disagreement on the question of “whether the 
act of isolating DNA—separating a specific gene or sequence of 
nucleotides from the rest of the chromosome—is an inventive act that 
entitles the individual who first isolates it to a patent.”125  First, Judge 
Lourie’s conclusion that the isolated DNA was patentable rested on the 
required breaking of the covalent bonds at each end of the DNA 
sequence.126  In his view, the breaking of these bonds created a new 
molecule with a new chemical composition and was thus dispositive to 
the patentability of the isolated DNA, despite the fact that the key feature 
of DNA, its ability to transmit information, remained unchanged.127  
Contrarily, Judge Moore did not believe the breaking of the chemical 
bonds to be sufficient to put isolated human genes in the scope of 
patentable subject matter, but instead relied on the Patent Office’s 
practice of granting patents as her basis for patent eligibility.128  The lone 
dissenting Judge, Judge Bryson, downplayed the act of breaking 
chemical bonds, calling it devoid of any “magic” to “require[] us to 
                                                          
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 2114. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.  (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)). 
 124.  Id. 
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 127.  Id. at 2114–15.  
 128.  Id. at 2115.  
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recognize a new product when a chemical bond is created or broken.”129  
Instead, the dispositive question to Judge Bryson was the substance of 
the nucleotide sequences: the unchanged genetic structure of the isolated 
DNA.130 
The Court started by distinguishing the situation in Chakrabarty.  
While Dr. Chakrabarty had created a new bacterium with characteristics 
not found in nature, Myraid had merely discovered a gene and isolated 
that gene, but had not created anything.131  However, discovery, no 
matter how revolutionary, had never been grounds for patentability under 
§ 101.132  In the Court’s view, this case was much closer to Funk than 
Chakrabarty: the discovery of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes fall within 
the “law of nature” exception just as the mixture of naturally occurring 
strains of bacteria did in Funk.133  The isolation of the genes is equally 
inadequate to move the composition claims within the scope of § 101.134  
The claims in no way relate to the chemical structure of the DNA, but 
instead are based on the genetic information for which the DNA 
encodes.135  Following these conclusions, the Court held “that genes and 
the information they encode are not patent eligible under § 101.”136  
However, this holding excludes cDNA and the claims to the synthetic 
BRCA cDNA at issue here.137  The cDNA is unquestionably new and 
different from the naturally occurring DNA as it is an “exons-only 
molecule,”138 and is thus patent eligible so long as the cDNA strand is, in 
fact, distinguishable from natural DNA.139 
B. Synthesizing a Framework 
With these cases in mind, a working framework can be developed to 
determine whether a claimed invention falls outside the scope of § 101.  
The often-overlapping nature of the novelty doctrine and patent eligible 
                                                          
 129.  Id. (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (internal quotation omitted)). 
 130.  Id. at 2115. 
 131.  Id. at 2116–17. 
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 133.  Id. at 2116–17. 
 134.  Id. at 2118. 
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 136.  Id. at 2120. 
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subject matter doctrine can lead to a conflating of the rules of each.140  
For that reason it is important to parse through the discussed precedent 
and separate the rules regarding novelty over prior art from the rules 
about products of nature. 
The Wood–Paper Patent case stands for the proposition that a 
previously known manufacture is not entitled to a patent simply because 
it is made by a new process.141  Kuehmsted stands for the proposition that 
a product obtained through the purification of an already existing, non-
natural product, is patent worthy where the purified substance has 
qualitatively different properties.142  Union Carbide stands for the 
proposition that a new form of an already existing, non-naturally 
occurring, chemical compound is patentably novel where the new form is 
not in the prior art, and where the new form provides substantial benefits 
to that disclosed in the prior art.143  Parke-Davis can be said to stand for 
the proposition that a chemical compound, isolated from nature and then 
purified, in a form not known in the prior art, is not merely a “degree of 
purity,” of the prior art, but rather a new product altogether.144  Parke-
Davis should not be extended beyond this holding because, as discussed 
above, Judge Hand’s assertion that an unaltered extract is patent eligible 
is contrary to all the isolation/purification jurisprudence.145 
These cases delineate the isolation/purification doctrine as it relates 
to non-products of nature prior art.  However, they do not provide a clear 
line as to the novelty of purified products.  Both Union Carbide and 
Parke-Davis characterize the patents at issue as “new products” entirely, 
rather than just purified substances, while the Wood-Paper Patent case 
expressly declines to address the purification question.  The only 
guidance comes from Kuehmsted.  Using Kuehmsted as a guiding 
principle, a purified form of prior art will be patentable so long as it has 
qualitatively different properties.  Said another way, the 
isolation/purification doctrine as it pertains to novelty is a fiction.  What 
the court in Kuehmsted essentially held was that the purified form will be 
                                                          
 140.  Richard Seth Gipstein, The Isolation and Purification Exception to the General 
Unpatentability of Products of Nature, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 141.  Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co. (The Wood–Paper Patent), 90 U.S. 566, 
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patentable if it meets all the requirements for patentability (e.g., not 
anticipated, not obvious in view of the prior art, and has utility).146  
Therefore, there is no bright-line rule as to when a purified form of prior 
art will be patent eligible, there are only the existing patent law 
requirements. 
Next in the line of cases was General Electric, which stands for the 
proposition that merely isolating a product of nature from its 
environment does not make that product patent eligible.147  This was 
followed by Funk, which stands for the proposition that a mixture of 
naturally occurring distinct compositions which does not give rise to new 
properties as a result of the mixing is not patent eligible subject matter.148  
Chakrabarty then stands for the principle that the designation of a 
composition of matter as “living” does not remove it from the scope of 
“composition of matter,” and thus is patentable subject matter so long as 
it is non-naturally occurring and an invention of man.149  Myriad stands 
for the proposition that the separation of a composition from its 
surroundings does not make the separated composition patent eligible 
subject matter.150 
The cases directed to patent eligible subject matter can be reduced 
down to a basic principle: an isolated or purified composition is not 
patent eligible subject matter, but is merely a “raw material,” if the 
composition’s characteristics were not bestowed on it by the inventor, 
because the characteristics were not made by man.  However, if 
combined with other raw materials, it could become patent eligible 
subject matter where the combination results in markedly different 
characteristics than present in the raw materials.  This characterization of 
the isolation/purification jurisprudence is consistent with viewing the 
products of nature exception to patentability as an absolute bar to 
novelty.  What is outlined by the cases is essentially a bright-line rule for 
determining whether the claimed invention is novel relative to the prior 
art (products of nature). 
C. The Patent Office’s Stance on Isolated Organism 
The Patent Office’s policy granting patents on “non-naturally 
occurring, nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals” 
                                                          
 146.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 147.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 646–47 (3d Cir. 1928). 
 148.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 149.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980). 
 150.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013). 
778 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
was the result of a notice issued by the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks in 1987, following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chakrabarty.151  The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
understands Chakrabarty to stand for four legal principles: (1) “‘the laws 
of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas’ are not patentable 
subject matter;” (2) if a manufacture or composition of matter is a 
product of human ingenuity, is non-naturally occurring, and has a 
“distinctive name, character [and] use,” it will be patentable; (3) a mere 
discovery will not be patentable as they are “manifestations of . . . nature, 
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none;” and (4) articles 
produced from materials in which the materials are given “new forms, 
qualities, properties, or combinations whether by hand labor or by 
machinery” are patentable subject matter.152 
The Patent Office’s definition of “non-naturally” seems to include 
naturally occurring microorganisms that have been isolated from 
nature.153  This view seems to have been derived from the lower court 
case, In re Bergy.154  This case had been a companion case to 
Chakrabarty, but was dismissed after Bergy decided to dismiss his claim 
to an isolated microorganism.155  However, mentioned within the lower 
court’s decision was dictum stating that the microorganisms were the 
patent eligible subject matter “because what was claimed was a 
biologically pure culture of the organism and the organism did not exist 
in a pure state in nature.”156 
III. ANALYSIS 
To determine whether the granting of patents on isolated or purified 
microorganisms is proper, two things must be done.  First, it is important 
to address the foundation of the Patent Office policy to determine its 
adherence to the patent eligible subject matter case law and to ensure it 
did not conflate the rules pertaining to novelty with that of patent eligible 
subject matter.  Second, if the underlying foundation is faulty, the next 
step is to explore whether isolated microorganisms are patent eligible 
                                                          
 151.  2 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2105 (8th ed. 2008). 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  See Schneider, supra note 2, at 593 n.12 (identifying three separate patents on 
microorganisms isolated from nature). 
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subject matter according to the earlier determined framework.157  This 
will be done by utilizing existing patents on isolated or purified 
microorganisms and analyzing the claim language to determine 
compliance with the framework. 
A. The Patent Office’s Improper Reliance on In re Bergy 
1. The Facts of In re Bergy 
In re Bergy was focused on a patent for a bacterium capable of 
producing an antibiotic under certain conditions.158  However, while this 
was the subject matter of the case, there was no question of whether the 
claims were proper patent eligible subject matter, as that had already 
been decided by the Patent Office.159  The two most important claims 
were claims 1 and 5.  Claim 1 read in substantial portion: 
A novel process for preparing the antibiotic lincomycin which 
comprises cultivating Streptomyces vellosus, having the identifying 
characteristics of NRRL 8037, and lincomycin-producing mutants 
thereof, in an aqueous nutrient medium under aerobic conditions until 
substantial antibiotic activity is imparted to said medium by the 
production of lincomycin.160 
This claim was not nearly as controversial, as it was a claim to a 
process utilizing the culture as merely one piece of the process, and 
processes fall within the defined scope of § 101.161  Claim 5 was more or 
less a derivative of this claim, claiming only the bacterium involved in 
the process of claim 1: 
A biologically pure culture of the microorganism Streptomyces 
vellosus, having the identifying characteristics of NRRL 8037, said 
culture being capable of producing the antibiotic lincomycin in a 
recoverable quantity upon fermentation in an aqueous nutrient medium 
containing assimilable sources of carbon, nitrogen and inorganic 
substances.162 
Claim 5 appears to be the support of the Patent Office’s conclusion 
that isolated and purified microorganisms are patent eligible subject 
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matter.  While they were not directly determining the eligibility of this 
claim, in dicta the court stated “a biologically pure culture produced by 
great labor in a laboratory” was a far cry from “something preexisting 
and merely plucked from the earth and claimed as such.”163  They further 
went on to say that if they had understood the separation and 
identification of strains of microorganisms, they would have perhaps 
supported the patentability of “something preexisting and merely plucked 
from the earth.”164 
2. The Flawed Reasoning of In re Bergy. 
The statements of law made by the court in In re Bergy clearly fell 
outside the established law on products of nature.  First, the court’s 
conclusion that “a biologically pure culture” was patentable subject 
matter was erroneous in view of the products of nature jurisprudence 
related to products of nature.  Perhaps most on point here is General 
Electric.  The biologically pure culture, purified for the first time, is not 
distinguishable from the elementally pure tungsten, also purified for the 
first time.  In fact, the language of General Electric can be applied 
directly to the culture at issue in Bergy: 
[Bergy] took [the microorganism] as it “existed” (WOs) or as it is 
found [on] the earth, its native abode, and by his process converted it 
into [a] pure [culture] . . . and, doubtless, was first to discover that 
when pure it has characteristics . . . which are wholly different from the 
characteristics of the impure [microorganism].165 
The same result comes when the facts of Bergy are analyzed 
according to the entire products of nature framework deduced in Part 
II.B.  The isolated and purified culture’s characteristics were bestowed 
on them by nature itself and were thus not the result of Bergy.166  It is 
immaterial that the isolation required extensive effort because 
“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery” is not enough 
to satisfy the requirements of § 101.167 
The flaw in the analysis is made clearer by again viewing the 
products of nature exception to patentability as an absolute bar to 
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novelty.  The isolated microorganism is not new; it already existed in 
nature.  While it is true that the microorganism did not exist in a 
“biologically pure culture” in nature, the biologically pure culture was 
obtained and derived from the existing microorganism.  Isolating this 
bacterium and producing a biologically pure culture amounts to nothing 
more than the mixing of bacterium that occurred in Funk. 
B. Analyzing Current Isolated Microorganisms Under the 
Isolation/Purification Framework 
The Patent Office’s misguided reliance on In re Bergy only answers 
the question of whether the policy is based on solid precedent; it is not.  
However, it does not mean that all the patents granted under this policy 
should have been considered outside the scope of patent eligible subject 
matter.  For example, any patent pertaining to any process utilizing an 
isolated biological culture is within the bounds of § 101 as discussed 
above.168  To properly demonstrate the isolation/purification framework 
derived from the case law, examining actual patents provides insight. 
1. The Micromonospora Patent 
The Micromonospora patent contained two claims to a new species 
of microorganism discovered in soil samples of Danubian mud.169  The 
two claims were to the species as a whole, as well as to a particular strain 
of the species.  Claim 1 read: “A substantially biologically pure culture 
of the actinomyces species Micromonospora danubiensis having the 
capability of producing sisomicin upon cultivation in an aqueous nutrient 
medium.”170 
This claim is clearly outside the scope of § 101.  The first step of the 
proposed framework is to determine whether the claimed invention is to 
an isolation or purification of a substance.  The claim here is to the entire 
species of microorganism isolated from the Danubian mud,171 satisfying 
the first prong of the framework.  The next question is whether the 
microorganism’s characteristics were made by man or naturally 
occurring.  According to the patent description, when the actinomyces 
species was isolated, it already produced sisomicin.172  Therefore, this 
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characteristic was not an “invention” made by man, but rather a natural 
characteristic of the species.  Therefore, claim 1 should have been 
invalidated as a product of nature.  In this patent, the remaining 
framework questions need not be addressed. 
Claim 2 read: “A substantially biologically pure culture of the 
actinomyces strain Micromonospora danubiensis MNG-00171 having 
the capability of producing sisomicin upon cultivation in an aqueous 
nutrient medium.”173  The analysis of claim 2 will largely mirror that of 
claim 1.  The only question is whether the additional limitation of only 
claiming one particular strain of the species moves the claim into the 
realm of § 101.  It is helpful, then, to understand what exactly a strain is.  
A strain is “a subset of bacterial species differing from other bacteria of 
the same species by some minor but identifiable difference.”174  Thus, 
whereas claim 1 can be viewed as an isolation claim, this claim is more 
properly viewed as a purification claim.  However, that distinction does 
not make it patentable. 
Applying the isolation/purification framework to claim 2 yields the 
same result as claim 1.  First, the patent is claiming a purification of a 
substance.  The next question is whether the “different strain refining 
processes” used by the patentee makes the strain “made by man.”  The 
answer to this question is clearly no.  Similar to the analysis of claim 1, 
the strain of the microorganism existed with its inherent characteristics 
before it was “refined” by man.  The refining process did not bestow the 
characteristics to it, but merely identified and isolated the best 
microorganism for the patentee’s task. 
2. The Pseudomonas Gramini Patent  
The Pseudomonas Gramini patent,175 which issued as a patent on 
May 7, 2014, is more complex than the prior patent and contains several 
more claims as well.  These patent claims are worth examining, as it 
shows one way that claims can be drafted to at least receive some 
patentable protection on isolated microorganisms, if not on the 
microorganism itself.  Interestingly, the prosecution history of this patent 
shows just how easy it is to get a patent on isolated microorganisms 
through the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  
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Initially, claim 1 reads, “a substantially pure biological culture 
composition comprising a strain of the species Pseudomonas 
graminis . . . .”176  This strain was obtained by: 
[isolating it] from the surface of a “Golden Delicious” apple by means 
of washing with sterile water, followed by immersion in saline-peptone 
solution . . . , sonication in an ultrasound bath for 10 min and planting 
the washing liquid in NYDA culture medium . . . , and subsequent 
incubation at 25° C. for 3 days.177 
The USPTO originally rejected this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
because it was directed to a “biological culture of a bacterial strain” and 
was thus a product of nature.178  However, rather than outright rejecting 
the claim, the Patent Office suggested that “applicant use the language 
‘isolated’ in connection with ‘substantially pure biological culture’ to 
identify a product that is not found in nature.”179  Thus, according to the 
Patent Office, the modifier of “isolated” is enough to convert the claimed 
subject matter into patentable subject matter.  How would this amended 
claim language stand up to the proposed isolation/purification 
framework? 
Applying the isolation/purification framework, this claim will only 
be patent eligible subject matter if the process by which it was isolated 
bestowed upon it the characteristics desired in the patent.  While the 
information provided by the patent shows a complicated procedure for 
isolating the microorganism, this procedure is not responsible for its 
“effectiveness as an antagonist against foodborne pathogenic bacteria in 
fruit.”180  Rather, the isolation procedure merely allowed the patent 
applicant to obtain the best microorganism that already had these 
characteristics, i.e., the applicant did not invent anything.  For that 
reason, no further analysis through the framework is necessary: this 
claim should fall outside the scope of patent eligible subject matter as a 
product of nature. 
This patent, however, is not without hope.  The patent also claimed a 
process or method.  Claim 17 reads: “A method of treating fruit, said 
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method comprising the step of: applying a preparation to a fruit, wherein 
the preparation comprises a culture of a strain of a species Pseudomonas 
graminis . . . .”181 
This claim is entitled to a patent, as it is not limited to a product of 
nature, but rather is to a process, which is patent eligible subject matter 
expressly defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101,182 so long as it meets the remaining 
requirements of patentability.  While the distinction between a claim to 
the microorganism and a claim to the process utilizing the 
microorganism for its natural characteristics may seem subtle, processes 
have long been held to be patentable, even if the products used in that 
process are not.183 Thus, ending the practice of granting product patents 
on isolated organisms would not leave the patent without options. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the patent laws was to foster ingenuity and 
inventiveness by rewarding people who contributed to society by 
advancing technology and the arts.  The granting of patents on isolated 
microorganisms does not serve that purpose.  The law is developed in a 
way to ensure that only those inventions that furthered this goal would be 
granted a patent.  However, because of a conflation between the 
doctrines of novelty and patentable subject matter, patents are being 
granted that were never intended to be granted. 
The patent law jurisprudence establishes that while purification and 
isolation may, in some circumstances, satisfy the patent law requirement 
of novelty over the prior art, it still does not qualify as patentable subject 
matter if it is the mere isolation or purification of nature.  The framework 
developed by this Comment more accurately reflects this jurisprudence: 
it adheres to the intent of the founders and the precedent of the courts 
that has been developed for over a century.  The Patent Office should 
reconsider its policy of granting patents on isolated microorganisms, and 
adopt a policy that accurately reflects the law.  If the Patent Office does 
not change its policy, these patents will continue to be granted until the 
Supreme Court is faced with the question. 
The granting of these patents is a disservice to society.  By granting a 
monopoly to an entire species of an isolated microorganism, it allows the 
patent owner to preclude others from experimenting with and advancing 
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possible biosciences relevant to that microorganism.  The granting of 
only process claims involving isolated microorganisms far better serves 
the public.  By doing so, the patent owner only gains a monopoly on the 
microorganism for as far as the patent owner has created a new and 
useful process for it; the patent owner does not gain unlimited control of 
the microorganism, leaving it open for others to come in and advance the 
art. 
 
